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Abstract
The evaluation of robustness against adversarial
manipulation of neural networks-based classifiers
is mainly tested with empirical attacks as methods
for the exact computation, even when available,
do not scale to large networks. We propose in
this paper a new white-box adversarial attack wrt
the lp-norms for p ∈ {1, 2,∞} aiming at finding
the minimal perturbation necessary to change the
class of a given input. It has an intuitive geomet-
ric meaning, yields quickly high quality results,
minimizes the size of the perturbation (so that it
returns the robust accuracy at every threshold with
a single run). It performs better or similar to state-
of-the-art attacks which are partially specialized
to one lp-norm, and is robust to the phenomenon
of gradient masking.
1. Introduction
The finding of the vulnerability of neural networks-based
classifiers to adversarial examples, that is small perturba-
tions of the input able to modify the decision of the models,
started a fast development of a variety of attack algorithms.
The high effectiveness of adversarial attacks reveals the
fragility of these networks which questions their safe and
reliable use in the real world, especially in safety critical
applications. Many defenses have been proposed to fix this
issue (Gu & Rigazio, 2015; Zheng et al., 2016; Papernot
et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2016; Bastani et al., 2016; Madry
et al., 2018), but with limited success, as new more pow-
erful attacks showed (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Athalye
et al., 2018; Mosbach et al., 2018). In order to trust the
decision of a model, it is necessary to evaluate the exact
adversarial robustness. Although this is possible for ReLU
networks (Katz et al., 2017; Tjeng et al., 2019) these tech-
niques do not scale to commonly used large networks. Thus,
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the robustness is evaluated approximating the solution of
the minimal adversarial perturbation problem through ad-
versarial attacks.
One can distinguish attacks into black-box (Narodytska &
Kasiviswanathan, 2016; Brendel et al., 2018; Su et al., 2019),
where one is only allowed to query the classifier, and white-
box attacks, where one has full control over the network,
according to the attack model used to create adversarial
examples (typically some lp-norm, but others have become
popular as well, e.g. (Brown et al., 2017; Engstrom et al.,
2017; Wong et al., 2019)), whether they aim at the minimal
adversarial perturbation (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Chen
et al., 2018; Croce et al., 2019) or rather any perturbation
below a threshold (Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018;
Zheng et al., 2019), if they have lower (Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2016; Modas et al., 2019) or higher (Carlini & Wagner,
2017a; Croce et al., 2019) computational cost. Moreover, it
is clear that due to the non-convexity of the problem there
exists no universally best attack (apart from the exact meth-
ods), since this depends on runtime constraints, networks
architecture, dataset, etc. However, our goal is to have
an attack which performs well under a broad spectrum of
conditions with minimal amount of hyperparameter tuning.
In this paper we propose a new white-box attack scheme
which performs comparably or better than established at-
tacks and has the following features: first, it aims at adver-
sarial samples with minimal distance to the attacked point,
measured wrt the lp-norms with p ∈ {1, 2,∞}. Compared
to the popular PGD (projected gradient descent)-attack of
(Madry et al., 2018) this has the clear advantage that our
method does not need to be restarted for every threshold 
if one wants to evaluate the success rate of the attack with
perturbations constrained to be in {δ ∈ Rd | ‖δ‖p ≤ }.
Thus it is particularly suitable to get a complete picture on
the robustness of a classifier with low computational cost.
Second, it achieves fast good quality in terms of average
distortion or robust accuracy. At the same time we show
that increasing the number of restarts keeps improving the
results and makes it competitive to or stronger than the
strongest available attacks. Third, although it comes with a
few parameters, these generalize well across datasets, archi-
tectures and norms considered, so that we have an almost
off-the-shelf method. Most importantly, unlike PGD and
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other methods, there is no step size parameter, which poten-
tially has to be carefully adapted to every new network, and
we show that it is scaling invariant. Both properties lead to
the fact that it is robust to gradient masking which can be a
problem for PGD (Tramèr & Boneh, 2019).
2. FAB: a Fast Adaptive Boundary Attack
We first introduce minimal adversarial perturbations, then
we recall the definition and properties of the projection wrt
the lp-norms of a point on the intersection of a hyperplane
and box constraints, as they are an essential part of our
attack. Finally, we present our FAB-attack algorithm to
generate minimally distorted adversarial examples.
2.1. Minimal adversarial examples
Let f : Rd → RK be a classifier which assigns every
input x ∈ Rd (with d the dimension of the input space)
to one of the K classes according to argmax
r=1,...,K
fr(x). In
many scenarios the input of f has to satisfy a specific set
of constraints C, e.g. images are represented as elements
of [0, 1]d. Then, given a point x ∈ Rd with true class c, we
define the minimal adversarial perturbation for x wrt the
lp-norm as
δmin,p = argmin
δ∈Rd
‖δ‖p ,
s.th. max
l 6=c
fl(x+ δ) ≥ fc(x+ δ), x+ δ ∈ C.
(1)
The optimization problem (1) is non-convex and NP-hard
for non-trivial classifiers (Katz et al., 2017) and, although for
some classes of networks it can be formulated as a mixed-
integer program (Tjeng et al., 2019), the computational
cost of solving it is prohibitive for large, normally trained
networks. Thus, δmin,p is usually approximated by an attack
algorithm, which can be seen as a heuristic to solve (1). We
will see in the experiments that current attacks sometimes
drastically overestimate ‖δmin,p‖p and thus the robustness
of the networks.
2.2. Projection on a hyperplane with box constraints
Let w ∈ Rd and b ∈ R be the normal vector and the offset
defining the hyperplane pi : 〈w, x〉 + b = 0. Let x ∈ Rd,
we denote by the box-constrained projection wrt the lp-
norm of x on pi (projection onto the intersection of the box
C = {z ∈ Rd : li ≤ zi ≤ ui} and the hyperplane pi) the
following minimization problem:
z∗ = argmin
z∈Rd
‖z − x‖p (2)
s.th. 〈w, z〉+ b = 0, li ≤ zi ≤ ui, i = 1, ... , d,
where li, ui ∈ R are lower and upper bounds on each com-
ponent of z. For p ≥ 1 the optimization problem (2) is
convex. (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017) proved that for
p ∈ {1, 2,∞} the solution can be obtained in O(d log d)
time, that is the complexity of sorting a vector of d elements,
as well as determining that there exists no feasible point.
Since this projection is part of our iterative scheme, we need
to handle specifically the case of (2) being infeasible. In this
case, defining ρ = sign(〈w, x〉 + b), we instead compute
z′ = argmin
li≤zi≤ui
ρ · (〈w, z〉+ b), whose solution is
z′i =

li if ρwi > 0,
ui if ρwi < 0,
xi if wi = 0
for i = 1, ... , d. (3)
Assuming that the point x satisfies the box constraints (as it
holds in our algorithm), this is equivalent to identifying the
corner of the d-dimensional box, defined by the component-
wise constraints on z, closest to the hyperplane pi. Note that
if (2) is infeasible then the objective function of (3) stays
positive and the points x and z are strictly contained in the
same of the two halfspaces divided by pi. Finally, we define
the projection operator
projp : (x, pi, C) 7−→
{
z∗ if (2) is feasible
z′ else (4)
which yields the point as close as possible to pi without
violating the box constraints.
2.3. FAB-attack
We introduce now our algorithm to produce minimally
distorted adversarial examples, wrt any lp-norm for p ∈
{1, 2,∞}, for a given point xorig initially correctly classi-
fied by f as class c. The high-level idea is that, first, we use
the linearization of the classifier at the current iterate x(i)
to compute the box-constrained projections of x(i) respec-
tively xorig onto the approximated decision hyperplane and,
second, we take a convex combinations of these projections
depending on the distance of x(i) and xorig to the decision
hyperplane. Finally, we perform an extrapolation step. We
explain below the geometric motivation behind these steps.
The attack closest in spirit is DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2016) which is known to be very fast but suffers from
low quality. DeepFool just tries to find the decision bound-
ary quickly but has no incentive to provide a solution close
to xorig. Our scheme resolves this main problem and, to-
gether with the exact projection we use, leads to a principled
way to track the decision boundary (the surface where the
decision of f changes) close to xorig.
If f was a linear classifier then the closest point to x(i)
on the decision hyperplane could be found in closed form.
However neural networks are highly non-linear (although
ReLU networks, i.e. neural networks which use ReLU as
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activation function, are piecewise affine functions and thus
locally a linearization of the network is an exact description
of the classifier). Let l 6= c, then the decision boundary
between classes l and c can be locally approximated using a
first order Taylor expansion at x(i) by the hyperplane
pil(z) : fl(x
(i))− fc(x(i))
+
〈
∇fl(x(i))−∇fc(x(i)), z − x(i)
〉
= 0.
(5)
Moreover the lp-distance dp(x(i), pil) of x(i) to pil is given,
assuming 1p +
1
q = 1, by
dp(x
(i), pil) =
|fl(x(i))− fc(x(i))|∥∥∇fl(x(i))−∇fc(x(i))∥∥q . (6)
Note that if dp(x(i), pil) = 0 then x(i) belongs to the true de-
cision boundary. Moreover, if the local linear approximation
of the network is correct then the class s with the decision
hyperplane closest to the point x(i) can be computed as
s = argmin
l 6=c
|fl(x(i))− fc(x(i))|∥∥∇fl(x(i))−∇fc(x(i))∥∥q . (7)
Thus, given that the approximation holds in some large
enough neighborhood, the projection projp(x
(i), pis, C) of
x(i) onto pis lies on the decision boundary (unless (2) is
infeasible).
Biased gradient step: The iterative algorithm x(i+1) =
projp(x
(i), pis, C) would be similar to DeepFool except that
our projection operator is exact whereas they project onto
the hyperplane and then clip to [0, 1]d. This scheme is
not biased towards the original target point xorig, thus it
goes typically further than necessary to find a point on the
decision boundary as basically the algorithm does not aim
at the minimal adversarial perturbation. Then we consider
additionally projp(xorig, pis, C) and use instead the iterative
step, with x(0) = xorig and α ∈ [0, 1], defined as
x(i+1) = (1− α) projp(x(i), pis, C) + α projp(xorig, pis, C),
(8)
which biases the step towards xorig (see Figure 1). Note that
this is a convex combination of two points on pis and in C
and thus also x(i+1) lies on pis and is contained in C.
As we wish a scheme with minimal amount of parameters,
our goal is an automatic selection of α based on the available
geometric quantities. Let
δ(i) = projp(x
(i), pis, C)− x(i),
δ
(i)
orig = projp(xorig, pis, C)− xorig.
Figure 1. Visualization of FAB-attack scheme: Left, case η = 1,
right, η > 1 (extrapolation). In blue we show projp(x
(i), pis, C),
the iterate one would get without any bias towards xorig, in green
the effect of the bias we introduce and in red the actual iterate
x(i+1) of FAB-attack in (10). FAB-attack stays closer to xorig
compared to the unbiased gradient step with projp(x
(i), pis, C).
Note that
∥∥δ(i)∥∥
p
and
∥∥∥δ(i)orig∥∥∥
p
are the distances of x(i) and
xorig to pis (inside C). We propose to use for the parameter
α the relative magnitude of these two distances, that is
α = min

∥∥δ(i)∥∥
p∥∥δ(i)∥∥
p
+
∥∥∥δ(i)orig∥∥∥
p
, αmax
 ∈ [0, 1]. (9)
The motivation for doing so is that if x(i) is close to the
decision boundary then we should stay close to this point
(note that pis is the approximation of f computed at x(i) and
thus it is valid in a small neighborhood of x(i), whereas xorig
is farther away). On the other hand we want to have the
bias towards xorig in order not to go too far away from xorig.
This is why α depends on the distances of x(i) and xorig to
pis but we limit it from above with αmax. Finally, we use a
small extrapolation step as we noted empirically, similarly
to (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), that this helps to cross
faster the decision boundary and get an adversarial sample.
This leads to the final scheme:
x(i+1) = projC
(
(1− α)(x(i) + ηδ(i))+ α(xorig + ηδ(i)orig)),
(10)
where α is chosen as in (9), η ≥ 1 and projC is the projec-
tion onto the box which can be done by clipping. In Figure
1 we visualize the scheme: in black one can see the hyper-
plane pis and the vectors δ
(i)
orig and δ
(i), in blue the step not
biased towards xorig, while in red the biased step of FAB-
attack, see (10). The green vector shows the bias towards
the original point we introduce. On the left of Figure 1 we
use η = 1, while on the right we use extrapolation η > 1.
Interpretation of projp(xorig, pis, C): The projection of
the target point xorig onto the intersection of pis and C is
argmin
z∈Rd
‖z − xorig‖p s.th. 〈w, z〉+ b = 0, li ≤ zi ≤ ui,
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Note that replacing z by x(i) + δ we can rewrite this as
argmin
δ∈Rd
∥∥∥x(i) + δ − xorig∥∥∥
p
s.th.
〈
w, x(i) + δ
〉
+ b = 0, li ≤ xi + δi ≤ ui.
This can be interpreted as the minimization of the distance
of the next iterate x(i) + δ to the target point xorig so that
x(i) + δ lies on the intersection of the (approximate) deci-
sion hyperplane and the box C. This point of view on the
projection projp(xorig, pis, C) again justifies using a convex
combination of the two projections in our scheme in (10).
Backward step: The described scheme finds in a few iter-
ations adversarial perturbations. However, we are interested
in minimizing their norms. Thus, once we have a new point
x(i+1), we check whether it is assigned by f to a class
different from c. In this case, we apply
x(i+1) = (1− β)xorig + βx(i+1), β ∈ (0, 1), (11)
that is we go back towards xorig on the segment
[x(i+1), xorig], effectively starting again the algorithm at a
point which is close to the decision boundary. In this way,
due to the bias of the method towards xorig we successively
find adversarial perturbations of smaller norm, meaning that
the algorithm tracks the decision boundary while getting
closer to xorig. We fix β = 0.9 in all experiments.
Final search: Our scheme finds points close to the deci-
sion boundary but often they are slightly off as the linear
approximation is not exact and we apply the extrapolation
step with η > 1. Thus, after finishing Niter iterations of our
algorithmic scheme, we perform a last, fast step to further
improve the quality of the adversarial examples. Let xout
be the closest point to xorig classified differently from c,
say s 6= c, found with the iterative scheme. It holds that
fs(xout)− fc(xout) > 0 and fs(xorig)− fc(xorig) < 0. This
means that, assuming f continuous, there exists a point x∗
on the segment [xout, xorig] such that fs(x∗) − fc(x∗) = 0
and ‖x∗ − xorig‖p < ‖xout − xorig‖p. If f is linear
x∗ = xout − (fs(xout)− fc(xout)) (xout − xorig)
fs(xout)− fc(xout) + fs(xorig)− fc(xorig) .
(12)
Since f is non-linear, we compute iteratively for a few steps
xtemp = xout − (fs(xout)− fc(xout)) (xout − xorig)
fs(xout)− fc(xout) + fs(xorig)− fc(xorig) ,
(13)
each time replacing in (13) xout with xtemp if fs(xtemp) −
fc(xtemp) > 0 or xorig with xtemp if instead fs(xtemp) −
fc(xtemp) < 0. With this kind of modified binary search one
can find a better adversarial sample with the cost of a few
forward passes (which is fixed to 3 in all experiments).
Algorithm 1 FAB-attack
Input : xorig original point, c original class,
Nrestarts, Niter, αmax, β, η, , p
Output :xout adversarial example
u← +∞
for j = 1, ... , Nrestarts do
if j = 1 then x(0) ← xorig;
else x(0) ← randomly sampled s.th.∥∥x(0) − xorig∥∥p =
min{u,}/2;
for i = 0, ... , Niter − 1 do
s← argmin
l 6=c
|fl(x(i))−fc(x(i))|
‖∇fl(x(i))−∇fc(x(i))‖
q
δ(i) ← projp(x(i), pis, C)
δ
(i)
orig ← projp(xorig, pis, C)
compute α as in Equation (9)
x(i+1) ← projC
(
(1− α)
(
x(i) + ηδ(i)
)
+ α(xorig + ηδ
(i)
orig)
)
if x(i+1) is not classified as c then
if
∥∥x(i+1) − xorig∥∥p < u then
xout ← x(i+1)
u← ∥∥x(i+1) − xorig∥∥p
end
x(i+1) ← (1− β)xorig + βx(i+1)
end
end
end
perform 3 steps of final search on xout as in (13)
Random restarts: So far all the steps are deterministic.
To improve the results, we introduce the option of random
restarts, that is x(0) is randomly sampled in the proximity
of xorig instead of being xorig itself. Most attacks benefit
from random restarts, e.g. (Madry et al., 2018; Zheng et al.,
2019), especially dealing with models trained for robustness
(Mosbach et al., 2018), as it allows a wider exploration of
the input space. We choose to sample from the lp-sphere
centered in the original point with radius half the lp-norm of
the current best adversarial perturbation (or a given thresh-
old if no adversarial example has been found yet).
Computational cost: Our attack, in Algorithm 1, con-
sists of two main operations: the computation of f and
its gradients and solving the projection (2). We perform,
for each iteration, a forward and a backward pass of the
network in the gradient step and a forward pass in the back-
ward step. The projection can be efficiently implemented
to run in batches on the GPU and its complexity depends
only on the input dimension. Thus, except for shallow mod-
els, its cost is much smaller than the passes through the
network. We can approximate the computational cost of
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Figure 2. Ablation study to DeepFool for l∞-attacks. The
curves show the robust accuracy as a function of the threshold
 under different attacks on the l∞-AT model on MNIST (lower
values mean stronger attacks). The introduction of the convex
combination (αmax = 0.1, no backward step) already improves
over DeepFool. If one uses the backward step, the case αmax = 0
(which can be seen as an improved iterative DF) is worse than
αmax = 0.1 with the same number of restarts.
our algorithm by the total number of calls of the classifier
Niter×Nrestarts× (2× forward passes+1×backward pass)
Per restart one has to add the three forward passes for the
final search.
2.4. Scale Invariance of FAB-attack
For a given classifier f , the decisions and thus adversarial
samples do not change if we rescale the classifier g = αf
for α > 0 or shift its logits as h = f + β for β ∈ R. The
following proposition states that FAB-attack is invariant
under both rescaling and shifting (proof in Section A).
Proposition 2.1 Let f : Rd → RK be a classifier. Then for
any α > 0 and β ∈ R the output xout of Algorithm 1 for
the classifier f is the same as of the classifiers g = αf and
h = f + β.
We note that the cross-entropy loss CE(x, y, f) =
− log(efy(x)/∑Kj=1 efj(x)) used as objective in the normal
PGD attack and its gradient wrt x
∇xCE(x, y, f) = −∇xfy(x) +
∑K
j=1 e
fj(x)∇xfj(x)∑K
j=1 e
fj(x)
are not invariant under rescaling. Moreover, we observe
that the gradient vanishes for αf if fy(x) > fj(x) for
j 6= y (correctly classified point) as α → ∞. Due to
finite precision the gradient becomes zero for finite α and
it is obvious that in this case PGD gets stuck. Due to the
rescaling invariance FAB-attack is not affected by gradient
masking due to this phenomenon as it uses the gradient
of the differences of the logits and not the gradient of the
cross-entropy loss. The latter one runs much earlier into
numerical problems when one upscales the classifier due to
the exponential function. In the experiments (see below) we
show that PGD can catastrophically fail due to a “wrong”
scaling whereas FAB-attack is unaffected.
2.5. Comparison to DeepFool
The idea of exploiting the first order local approximation of
the decision boundary is not novel but the basis of one of
the first white-box adversarial attacks, DeepFool (DF) from
(Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). While DF and our FAB-
attack share the strategy of using a linear approximation of
the classifier and projecting on the decision hyperplanes, we
want to point out many key differences: first, DF does not
solve the projection (2) but its simpler version without box
constraints, clipping afterwards. Second, their gradient step
does not have any bias towards the original point, that is
equivalent to α = 0 in (10). Third, DF does not have any
backward step, final search or restart, as it stops as soon as
a misclassified point is found (its goal is to provide quickly
an adversarial perturbation of average quality).
We perform an ablation study of the differences to DF in Fig-
ure 2, where we show robust accuracy as a function of the
threshold  (lower is better). We present the results of Deep-
Fool (blue) and FAB-attack with the following variations:
αmax = 0.1 and no backward step (magenta), αmax = 0
(that is no bias in the gradient step) and no restarts (light
green), αmax = 0.1 and no restarts (orange), αmax = 0 and
100 restarts (dark green) and αmax = 0.1 and 100 restarts,
that is FAB-attack, (red). We can see how every addition
we make to the original scheme of DeepFool contributes to
the significantly improved performance of FAB-attack when
compared to the original DeepFool.
3. Experiments
Models: We run experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10
(Krizhevsky et al., 2014) and Restricted ImageNet (Tsipras
et al., 2019). For each dataset we consider a normally
trained model (plain) and two adversarially trained ones
as in (Madry et al., 2018) wrt the l∞-norm (l∞-AT) and the
l2-norm (l2-AT) (see B.1 for details).
Attacks: We compare the performance of FAB-attack1 to
those of attacks representing the state-of-the-art in each
norm: DeepFool (DF) (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016),
Carlini-Wagner l2-attack (CW) (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a),
Linear Region l2-Attack (LRA) (Croce et al., 2019), Pro-
jected Gradient Descent on the cross-entropy function
(PGD) (Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018; Tramèr &
Boneh, 2019), Distributionally Adversarial Attack (DAA)
(Zheng et al., 2019), SparseFool (SF) (Modas et al., 2019),
1https://github.com/fra31/fab-attack
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MNIST - l∞-attack:
MNIST - l2-attack:
MNIST - l1-attack:
Figure 3. Evolution of robust accuracy across iterations for different step sizes for PGD wrt l1, l2, l∞ for three different models on MNIST.
In red we highlight the step size we used for each norm in the experiments. Notice that it performs on average the best. Here we evaluate
on MNIST - the supplementary material contains also CIFAR-10 and other thresholds.
Elastic-net Attack (EAD) (Chen et al., 2018). We use DF
from (Rauber et al., 2017), CW and EAD as in (Papernot
et al., 2017), DAA and LRA with the code from the original
papers, while we reimplemented SF and PGD. For MNIST
and CIFAR-10 we used DAA with 50 restarts, PGD and
FAB with 100 restarts. For Restricted ImageNet, we used
DAA, PGD and FAB with 10 restarts (for l1 we used 5
restarts, since the methods benefit from more iterations).
Moreover, we could not use LRA since it hardly scales to
models of such scale and CW and EAD for compatibility
issues between the implementations of attacks and models.
See B.2 for more details e.g. regarding number of iterations
and hyperparameters of all attacks. In particular, we provide
in Section C.1 a detailed analysis of the dependency of PGD
on the step size. Indeed the optimal choice of the step size is
quite important for PGD. In order to select the optimal step
size for PGD for each norm, we performed a grid search
on the step size parameter in /t for t ∈ {1, 2, 4, 10, 25, 75}
for different models and thresholds, and took the values
working best on average, see Figure 3 for an illustration
(similar plots for other datasets and thresholds are presented
in Section C.1). As a result we use for PGD wrt l∞ step
size /10 and the direction is the sign of the gradient of the
cross entropy loss, for PGD wrt l2 we do a step in the di-
rection of the l2-normalized gradient with step size /4, for
PGD wrt l1 we use the gradient step suggested in (Tramèr
& Boneh, 2019) (with sparsity levels of 1% for MNIST and
10% for CIFAR-10 and Restricted ImageNet) with step size
/2. For FAB-attack we use always β = 0.9 and on MNIST
and CIFAR-10: αmax = 0.1, η = 1.05 and on Restricted
ImageNet: αmax = 0.05, η = 1.3. These parameters are
the same for all norms.
Evaluation metrics: The robust accuracy for a thresh-
old  is the classification accuracy (in percentage) when an
adversary is allowed to change every test input with per-
turbations of lp-norm smaller than  in order to change the
decision. Thus stronger attacks produce lower robust accu-
racies. For each model and dataset we fix five thresholds at
which we compute the robust accuracy for each attack (we
choose the thresholds so that the robust accuracy covers the
range between clean accuracy and 0). We evaluate the at-
tacks by the following statistics: i) avg. rob. accuracy: the
mean of the robust accuracies achieved by the attack over
all models and thresholds (lower is better), ii) # best: how
many times the attack achieves the lowest robust accuracy
(it is the most effective), iii) avg. difference to best: for
each model/threshold we compute the difference between
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Table 1. Performance summary of all attacks on MNIST and CIFAR-10 (aggregated). We report, for each norm, "avg. rob. acc.", the
mean of robust accuracies across all models and datasets (lower is better), "# best", number of times the attack is the best one, "avg. diff.
to best" and "max diff. to best", the mean and maximum difference of the robust accuracy of the attack to the robust accuracy of the
best attack for each model/threshold (on the first 1000 points for l∞ and l1, 500 for l2, of the test sets). The numbers after the name of
the attacks indicate the number of restarts. In total we have 5 thresholds × 6 models = 30 cases for each of the 3 norms. *Note that for
FAB-10 (i.e. with 10 restarts) the "# best" is computed excluding the results of FAB-100.
statistics on MNIST + CIFAR-10
l∞-norm DF DAA-50 PGD-100 FAB-10 FAB-100
avg. rob. acc. 58.81 60.67 46.07 46.18 45.47
# best 0 8 12 13* 17
avg. diff. to best 14.58 16.45 1.85 1.96 1.25
max diff. to best 78.10 49.00 10.70 20.30 17.10
l2-norm CW DF LRA PGD-100 FAB-10 FAB-100
avg. rob. acc. 45.09 56.10 36.97 44.94 36.41 35.57
# best 4 1 9 11 19* 23
avg. diff. to best 9.65 20.67 1.54 9.51 0.98 0.13
max diff. to best 65.40 91.40 13.60 64.80 8.40 1.60
l1-norm SF EAD PGD-100 FAB-10 FAB-100
avg. rob. acc. 64.47 35.79 49.51 33.26 29.46
# best 0 13 0 10* 17
avg. diff. to best 35.31 6.63 20.35 4.10 0.30
max diff. to best 95.90 58.40 74.00 21.80 1.60
Table 2. As in Table 1 statistics of the performance of different attacks on Restricted ImageNet (on the first 500 points of the validation
set). In total we consider 5 thresholds × 3 models = 15 cases for each of the 3 norms.
statistics on Restricted ImageNet
l∞-norm l2-norm l1-norm
DF DAA-
10
PGD-
10
FAB-
10
DF PGD-
10
FAB-
10
SF PGD-
5
FAB-
5
avg. rob. acc. 35.61 38.44 26.91 27.83 45.69 31.75 33.24 71.31 40.64 38.12
# best 0 1 13 3 0 14 1 0 3 12
avg. diff. best 8.75 11.57 0.04 0.96 13.99 0.04 1.53 33.52 2.85 0.33
max diff. best 14.60 37.20 0.40 2.00 25.40 0.60 3.40 59.00 6.20 2.40
the robust accuracy of the attack and the best one across all
the attacks, then we average over all models/thresholds, iv)
max difference to best: as "avg. difference to best", but
with the maximum difference instead of the average one. In
Section B.4 we report additionally the average lp-norm of
the adversarial perturbations given by the attacks.
Results: We report the complete results in Tables 7 to
15 of the appendix, while we summarize them in Table
1 (MNIST and CIFAR-10 aggregated, as we used the
same attacks) and Table 2 (Restricted ImageNet). Our
FAB-attack achieves the best results in all statistics for
every norm (with the only exception of "max diff. to best"
in l∞) on MNIST+CIFAR-10. In particular, while on l∞
the "avg. robust accuracy" of PGD is not far from that of
FAB, the gap is large when considering l2 and l1 (in the
appendix we provide in Table 5 the aggregate statistics
without the result on l∞-AT MNIST, showing that FAB is
still the best attack even if one leaves out this failure case
of PGD). Interestingly, the second best attack in terms of
average robust accuracy, is different for every norm (PGD
for l∞, LRA for l2, EAD for l1), which implies that FAB
outperforms algorithms specialized in the individual norms.
We also report the results of FAB-10, that is our attack with
only 10 restarts, to show that FAB yields high quality results
already with a low budget in terms of time/computational
cost. In fact, FAB-10 has "avg. robust accuracy" better
than or very close to that of the strongest versions of the
other attacks (see below for a runtime analysis, where one
observes that FAB-10 is the fastest attack when excluding
the significantly worse DF and SF attacks). On Restricted
ImageNet, FAB-attack gets the best results in all statistics
for l1, while for l∞ and l2 PGD performs on average better,
but the difference in "avg. robust accuracy" is small.
In general, both average and maximum difference to best
of FAB-attack are small for all the datasets and norms,
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implying that it does not suffer from severe failures, which
makes it an efficient, high quality technique to evaluate
the robustness of classifiers for all lp-norms. Finally, we
show in Table 6 that FAB-attack outperforms or matches
the competitors in 16 out of 18 cases when comparing the
average lp-norms of the generated adversarial perturbations.
Table 3. We attack the ResNet-110 in (Pang et al., 2020) on CIFAR-
10 at  = 8/255. The performance of the PGD attack on the cross
entropy loss (CE) heavily depends on both scale of the classifier
and the step size. In contrast, the scaling invariant FAB-attack
works well even on the original (unscaled) model.
attack step size robust accuracy
PGD-CE /10 90.2%
PGD-CE /2 90.2%
PGD-CE rescaled /10 12.9%
PGD-CE rescaled /2 2.5%
FAB - 0.3%
Resistance to gradient masking: It has been argued
(Tramèr & Boneh, 2019) that models trained with first-
order methods to be resistant wrt l∞-attacks on MNIST
(adv. training) give a false sense of robustness in l1 and l2
due to gradient masking. This means that standard gradient-
based methods like PGD have problems to find adversarial
examples while they still exist. In contrast, FAB does not
suffer from gradient masking. In Table 8 of the appendixwe
see that it is extremely effective also wrt l1 and l2 on the
l∞-robust model, outperforming by a large margin the com-
petitors. The reason is that FAB is not dependent on the
norm of the gradient but just its direction matters for the
definition of the hyperplane in (5). While we believe that
resistance to gradient masking is a key property of a solid
attack, we recompute the statistics of Table 1 excluding l1
and l2 attacks on the l∞-AT model on MNIST in Table 5
in the appendix. FAB still achieves in most of the cases the
best aggregated statistics, implying that our attack is effec-
tive whether or not the attacked classifier tends to "mask"
the gradient.
We have shown in Section 2.4 that FAB-attack is invariant
under rescaling of the classifier. We provide an example
why this is a desirable property of an adversarial attack. We
consider the defense proposed in (Pang et al., 2020), in par-
ticular their ResNet-110 (without adversarial training) for
CIFAR-10. In Table 5 in (Pang et al., 2020) it is claimed that
this model has a robust accuracy of 31.4% for 8/255 obtained
by a PGD attack on their new loss function. They say that
a standard PGD attack on the cross-entropy loss performs
much worse. We test the performance of PGD on the cross-
entropy loss, both using the original classifier and the same
scaled down by a factor of 106. Moreover, we use the de-
fault step size /10 together with /2. The results are reported
in Table 3. We can see that PGD on the original model
yields more than 90% robust accuracy which confirms the
statement in (Pang et al., 2020) about the cross-entropy loss
being unsuitable for this case. However, PGD applied to
the rescaled classifier reduces robust accuracy below 13%.
The better step size /2 decreases it to 2.5% which shows
that tuning the stepsize is important for PGD. At the same
time, FAB achieves a robust accuracy of 0.3% without any
need of parameter tuning or rescaling of the classifier. This
exemplifies the benefit of the scaling invariance of FAB.
Moreover, as a side result this shows that the new loss alone
in (Pang et al., 2020) is an ineffective defense.
Runtime comparison: DF and SF are much faster than
the other attacks as their primary goal is to find as fast as
possible adversarial examples, without emphasis on mini-
mizing their norms, while LRA is rather expensive as noted
in the original paper. PGD needs a forward and a backward
pass of the network per iteration whereas FAB requires three
passes for each iteration. Thus PGD is given 1.5 times more
iterations than FAB, so that overall they have same budget
of forward/backward passes (and thus runtime). Below we
report the runtimes (for 1000 points on MNIST and CIFAR-
10, 50 on R-ImageNet) for the attacks as used in the experi-
ments (if not specified otherwise, it includes all the restarts).
For PGD and DAA this is the time for evaluating the ro-
bust accuracy at 5 thresholds, while for the other methods a
single run is sufficient to compute the robust accuracy for
all five thresholds. MNIST: DAA 11736s, PGD 3825s for
l∞/l2 and 14106s for l1, CW 944s, EAD 606s, FAB-10 161s,
FAB-100 1613s. CIFAR-10: DAA 11625s, PGD 31900s
for l∞/l2 and 70110s for l1, CW 3691s, EAD 3398s, FAB-
10 1209s, FAB-100 12093s. R-ImageNet: DAA 6890s,
PGD 4738s for l∞/l2 and 24158s for l1, FAB 2268s for
l∞/l2 and 3146s for l1 (note that for l1 different numbers of
restarts/iterations are used on R-ImageNet).
We note that for PGD the robust accuracy for the five thresh-
olds can be computed faster by exploiting the fact that points
which are non-robust for a thresholds  are also non-robust
for thresholds larger than . However, even when taking this
into account FAB-10 would still be significantly faster than
PGD-100 and has better quality on MNIST and CIFAR-
10. Moreover, when just considering a fixed number of
thresholds, one can stop FAB-attack whenever it finds an
adversarial example for the smallest threshold which also
leads to a speed-up. However, in real world applications
a full picture of robustness as a continuous function of the
threshold is the most interesting evaluation scenario.
3.1. Additional results
In Section C.2 we show how the robust accuracy provided
by either PGD or FAB-attack evolves over iterations, when
only one start it used. In particular, we compare the two
methods when the same number of passes, forward or back-
ward, of the networks are used. One can observe that a
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few steps are usually sufficient for FAB-attack to achieve
good results, often faster than PGD, although there are cases
where a higher number of iterations leads to significantly
better robust accuracy.
Finally, (Croce & Hein, 2020) use FAB-attack together with
other white- and black-box attacks to evaluate the robustness
of over 50 classifiers trained with recently proposed adver-
sarial defenses wrt l∞ and l2 on different datasets. With
fixed hyperparameters, FAB-attack yields the best results in
most of the cases on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet
in both norms, in particular compared to different variations
of PGD (with and without a momentum term, with different
step sizes and using various losses). This shows again that
FAB-attack is very effective for testing the robustness of
adversarial defenses.
4. FAB-attack with a large number of classes
The standard algorithm of FAB-attack requires to compute at
each iteration the Jacobian matrix of the classifier f wrt the
input x and then the closest approximated decision hyper-
plane. The Jacobian matrix has dimension K × d, recalling
that K is the number of classes and d the input dimension.
Although this can be in principle obtained with a single
backward pass of the network, it becomes computationally
expensive on datasets with many classes. Moreover, the
memory consumption of FAB-attack increases with K. As
a consequence, using FAB-attack in the normal formulation
on datasets like ImageNet which hasK = 1000 classes may
be inefficient.
Then, we propose a targeted version of our attack which
performs at each iteration the projection onto the linearized
decision boundary between the original class and a fixed
target class. This means that in (8) the hyperplane pis is
not selected via (7) as the closest one to the current iterate
but rather s ≡ t, with t the target class used. Note that
in practice we do not constrain the final outcome of the
algorithm to be assigned to class t, but any misclassification
is sufficient to have a valid adversarial example. The target
class t is selected as the second most likely one according
to the score given by the model to the target point, and if k
restarts are allowed one can use the classes with the k + 1
highest scores as target (excluding the correct one c). In this
way, only the gradient of ft − fc : Rd → R needs to be
computed, which is a cheaper operation than getting the full
Jacobian of f and with computational cost independent of
the total number of classes.
This targeted version of FAB-attack has been used in (Croce
& Hein, 2020) considering the top-10 classes where it yields
on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet almost always bet-
ter robust accuracy than normal FAB-attack, which instead
is almost always better on MNIST.
5. Conclusion
In summary, our geometrically motivated FAB-attack out-
performs in terms of average quality the state-of-the-art
attacks, already with a limited computational effort, and
works for all lp-norms in p ∈ {1, 2,∞} unlike most com-
petitors. Thanks to its scaling invariance and being step size
free it is resistant to gradient masking and thus more reliable
for assessing robustness than the standard PGD attack.
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A. Scale invariance of FAB-attack
We here describe the proof of Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1 Let f : Rd → RK be a classifier. Then for
any α > 0 and β ∈ R the output xout of Algorithm 1 for
the classifier f is the same as of the classifiers g = αf and
h = f + β.
Proof. It holds ∇gi = ∇αfi = α∇fi and ∇hi =
∇(fi + β) = ∇fi for i = 1, ... ,K and thus the definition
of the hyperplane pil(z) in (5) is not affected by rescaling
or shifting. The same holds for the distance of x(i) to the
hyperplane pil(z) in (7). Note that the rest of the steps just
depends on geometric quantities derived from these quan-
tities and are independent of f . Finally, also the iterates
of the final search in (13) are invariant under rescaling and
shifting and thus the output xout of Algorithm 1 is invariant
under rescaling of f . 
B. Experiments
B.1. Models
The plain and l∞-AT models on MNIST are those
available at https://github.com/MadryLab/
mnist_challenge and consist of two convolutional
and two fully-connected layers. The architecture of
the CIFAR-10 models has 8 convolutional layers (with
number of filters increasing from 96 to 384) and 2
dense layers and we make the classifiers available at
https://github.com/fra31/fab-attack,
while on Restricted ImageNet we use the models (ResNet-
50 (He et al., 2016)) from (Tsipras et al., 2019) and
available at https://github.com/MadryLab/
robust-features-code.
The models on MNIST achieve the following clean
accuracy: plain 98.7%, l∞-AT 98.5%, l2-AT 98.6%. The
models on CIFAR-10 achieve the following clean accuracy:
plain 89.2%, l∞-AT 79.4%, l2-AT 81.2%.
B.2. Attacks
We use CW with 40 binary search steps, 10000 iterations
and confidence 0, EAD with 1000 iterations, l1 decision
rule and β = 0.05. In both cases we set the parameters to
achieve minimally (wrt l2 for CW and l1 for EAD) distorted
adversarial examples. We could not use these methods on
Restricted ImageNet since, to be compatible with the attacks
from (Papernot et al., 2017), it would be necessary to reim-
plement from scratch the models of (Tsipras et al., 2019), as
done in https://github.com/tensorflow/
cleverhans/tree/master/cleverhans/
model_zoo/madry_lab_challenges for a similar
situation.
For DAA we use 200 iterations for MNIST, 50 for the other
datasets and, given a threshold , a step size of /30 for
MNIST, /10 otherwise.
We apply PGD with 150 iterations, except for the case of
l1 on Restricted ImageNet where we use 450 iterations. To
choose the step size for each norm, we performed a grid
search on the step size in /t for t ∈ {1, 2, 4, 10, 25, 75}
for different models and took the values working best on
average (note that this gives an advantage to PGD). A more
detailed analysis of the dependency of PGD on the step size
is given in Section C.1. As a result we use for PGD wrt l∞ a
step size of /10 and the direction is the sign of the gradient
of the cross-entropy loss, for PGD wrt l2 we do a step in the
direction of the normalized gradient of size /4, for PGD wrt
l1 we use the gradient step suggested in (Tramèr & Boneh,
2019) (with sparsity levels of 1% for MNIST and 10% for
CIFAR-10 and Restricted ImageNet) with step size /2.
For FAB-attack we set 100 iterations, except for the case
of l1 on Restricted ImageNet where we use 300 iterations.
Moreover, we use the following parameters for all the cases
on MNIST and CIFAR-10: αmax = 0.1, η = 1.05, β = 0.9.
On Restricted ImageNet we set αmax = 0.05, η = 1.3, β =
0.9. When using random restarts, FAB-attack needs a value
for the parameters . It represents the radius of the lp-ball
around the original point inside which we sample the starting
point of the algorithm, at least until a sufficiently small
adversarial perturbation is found (see Algorithm 1). We
use the values of  reported in Table 4. Note that the attack
usually finds at the first run an adversarial perturbation small
enough so that  in practice rarely comes into play.
B.3. Complete results
In Tables 7 to 15 we report the complete values of the robust
accuracy, wrt either l∞, l2 or l1, computed by every attack,
for 3 datasets, 3 models for each dataset, 5 thresholds for
each model (135 evaluations overall). In Table 5 we provide
the aggreate statistics on MNIST and CIFAR-10 without
the l∞-AT model of Madry, as there PGD fails completely
for l1- and l2-attacks. FAB has still the better aggregate
statistics if one leaves out these cases.
B.4. Further results
In Table 6 we report the average lp-norm of the adversarial
perturbations found by the different attacks, computed on
the originally correctly classified points on which the attack
is successful. Note that we cannot show this statistic for the
attacks which do not minimize the distance of the adversarial
example to the clean input (PGD and DAA). FAB-attack
produces also in this metric the best results in most of the
cases, being the best for every model when considering l∞
and l2, and the best in 4 out of 6 cases in l1 (lower values
mean a stronger attack).
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Table 4. We report the values of  used for sampling in case our FAB-attack uses random restarts.
values of  used for random restarts
MNIST CIFAR-10 Restricted ImageNet
plain l∞-AT l2-AT plain l∞-AT l2-AT plain l∞-AT l2-AT
l∞ 0.15 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08
l2 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.5 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
l1 40.0 40.0 40.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 100.0 250.0 250.0
Table 5. Performance summary of all attacks on MNIST and CIFAR-10 (aggregated). We report, for each norm, "avg. rob. acc.", the
mean of the robust accuracies across all models and datasets (lower is better), "# best", number of times the attack is the best one, "avg.
diff. to best" and "max diff. to best", the mean and maximum difference of the robust accuracy of the attack to the robust accuracy of the
best attack for each model/threshold (on the first 1000 points for l∞ and l1, 500 for l2, of the test sets). The numbers after the name of
the attacks indicate the number of restarts. In total we have 5 thresholds × 6 models = 30 cases for each of the 3 norms. *Note that for
FAB-10 (i.e. with 10 restarts) the "# best" is computed excluding the results of FAB-100. We also recompute the statistics excluding the
l∞-AT model on MNIST from (Madry et al., 2018) where PGD fails in order to show that even excluding this case FAB is still the best.
statistics on MNIST + CIFAR-10
l∞-norm DF DAA-50 PGD-100 FAB-10 FAB-100
avg. rob. acc. 58.81 60.67 46.07 46.18 45.47
# best 0 8 12 13* 17
avg. diff. to best 14.58 16.45 1.85 1.96 1.25
max diff. to best 78.10 49.00 10.70 20.30 17.10
l2-norm CW DF LRA PGD-100 FAB-10 FAB-100
avg. rob. acc. 45.09 56.10 36.97 44.94 36.41 35.57
# best 4 1 9 11 19* 23
avg. diff. to best 9.65 20.67 1.54 9.51 0.98 0.13
max diff. to best 65.40 91.40 13.60 64.80 8.40 1.60
l2-norm wo/ l∞-AT
model on MNIST
CW DF LRA PGD-100 FAB-10 FAB-100
avg. rob. acc. 40.85 49.18 40.25 42.95 39.98 39.57
# best 4 1 8 11 14* 18
avg. diff. to best 1.44 9.78 0.84 3.54 0.57 0.16
max diff. to best 8.80 44.00 4.00 22.00 4.20 1.60
l1-norm SF EAD PGD-100 FAB-10 FAB-100
avg. rob. acc. 64.47 35.79 49.51 33.26 29.46
# best 0 13 0 10* 17
avg. diff. to best 35.31 6.63 20.35 4.10 0.30
max diff. to best 95.90 58.40 74.00 21.80 1.60
l1-norm wo/ l∞-AT
model on MNIST
SF EAD PGD-100 FAB-10 FAB-100
avg. rob. acc. 58.06 32.56 43.82 33.79 32.06
# best 0 13 0 5* 12
avg. diff. to best 26.36 0.87 12.12 2.10 0.36
max diff. to best 53.10 4.80 31.90 3.90 1.60
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Table 6. We report mean lp-norm of the adversarial perturbations found by the attacks (when successful, excluding the already misclassified
points) for every model.
average norm of adversarial perturbations
l∞-norm DF FAB
MNIST
plain 0.078 0.066
l∞-at 0.508 0.326
l2-at 0.249 0.170
CIFAR-10
plain 0.008 0.006
l∞-at 0.032 0.024
l2-at 0.026 0.019
l2-norm DF CW LRA FAB
MNIST
plain 1.13 1.01 1.00 1.00
l∞-at 4.95 1.76 1.25 1.12
l2-at 3.10 2.35 2.25 2.24
CIFAR-10
plain 0.28 0.21 0.22 0.21
l∞-at 0.96 0.74 0.74 0.73
l2-at 0.91 0.71 0.72 0.70
l1-norm EAD FAB
MNIST
plain 6.38 6.04
l∞-at 8.26 3.36
l2-at 12.18 12.16
CIFAR-10
plain 3.01 2.87
l∞-at 5.79 6.03
l2-at 7.94 8.05
Table 7. Comparison of l∞-, l2- and l1-attacks on a naturally trained model on MNIST. We report the accuracy in percentage of the
classifier on the test set if the attack is allowed to perturb the test points of  in lp-distance. The statistics are computed on the first 1000
points on the test set for l∞ and l1, on 500 points for l2.
Robust accuracy of MNIST plain model
metric  DF DAA-
1
DAA-
50
PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l∞
0.03 93.2 91.9 91.9 92.0 91.9 91.9 92.0 92.0 92.0
0.05 83.4 78.2 76.7 76.0 74.9 74.6 77.2 76.8 76.1
0.07 61.5 59.8 56.3 43.8 41.8 40.4 44.3 43.1 42.6
0.09 33.2 46.7 41.0 16.5 14.2 12.8 16.2 14.8 14.4
0.11 13.1 34.4 26.2 4.0 2.8 2.4 3.3 3.1 2.4
CW DF LRA PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l2
0.5 92.6 93.6 92.6 92.6 92.6 92.6 92.6 92.6 92.6
1 47.4 58.6 47.4 48.4 47.4 46.2 47.0 46.8 46.2
1.5 8.8 19.8 7.8 9.8 8.8 8.2 7.8 7.2 7.0
2 0.6 1.8 0.2 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
SparseFool EAD PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l1
2 95.5 93.6 94.4 93.9 93.7 94.2 93.7 93.5
4 88.9 76.7 79.8 77.5 76.9 80.2 76.6 75.2
6 75.8 48.1 57.4 52.2 49.3 54.5 47.2 43.3
8 60.3 26.6 46.7 36.3 31.6 31.3 25.3 22.4
10 43.8 11.2 40.0 27.4 22.1 15.2 9.8 8.4
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Table 8. Comparison of l∞-, l2- and l1-attacks on an l∞-robust model on MNIST. We report the accuracy on the test set if the attack is
allowed to perturb the test points of  in lp-distance. The statistics are computed on the first 1000 points on the test set for l∞ and l1, on
500 points for l2.
Robust accuracy of MNIST l∞-robust model
metric  DF DAA-
1
DAA-
50
PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l∞
0.2 95.2 94.6 93.7 95.0 94.2 93.7 94.6 94.4 93.9
0.25 94.7 92.7 91.1 93.1 91.8 91.4 93.3 92.1 91.7
0.3 93.9 89.5 87.2 91.3 88.3 87.6 91.2 89.2 88.5
0.325 92.5 72.1 64.2 74.9 68.4 64.7 86.2 83.1 81.3
0.35 89.8 19.7 11.7 32.1 19.3 13.8 48.7 32.0 23.8
CW DF LRA PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l2
1 88.8 94.6 73.6 92.2 90.8 89.8 84.2 70.6 65.4
1.5 77.6 93.0 25.8 86.0 81.2 77.0 47.0 20.6 12.2
2 64.4 91.6 3.2 77.8 67.0 57.8 15.6 1.8 0.2
2.5 53.8 89.6 0.4 68.2 49.6 36.4 3.8 0.0 0.0
3 46.8 84.6 0.0 59.8 29.6 13.4 1.4 0.0 0.0
SparseFool EAD PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l1
2.5 96.8 92.2 94.1 93.7 93.6 88.0 74.3 56.9
5 96.5 76.0 90.9 88.9 88.2 78.3 39.4 17.6
7.5 96.4 49.5 85.2 81.4 79.0 66.1 19.8 5.0
10 96.4 27.4 80.2 73.5 70.3 49.3 11.9 2.4
12.5 96.4 14.6 74.9 65.6 58.7 35.6 7.7 0.5
Table 9. Comparison of l∞-, l2- and l1-attacks on an l2-robust model on MNIST. We report the accuracy in percentage of the classifier on
the test set if the attack is allowed to perturb the test points of  in lp-distance. The statistics are computed on the first 1000 points on the
test set for l∞ and l1, on 500 points for l2.
Robust accuracy of MNIST l2-robust model
metric  DF DAA-
1
DAA-
50
PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l∞
0.05 96.7 96.4 96.3 96.4 96.3 96.3 96.4 96.3 96.3
0.1 93.4 91.0 90.2 90.7 90.4 90.2 90.8 90.4 90.4
0.15 86.4 74.3 72.3 74.6 73.2 72.4 74.0 72.3 72.0
0.2 73.8 34.5 27.2 36.2 29.8 26.5 34.1 28.2 24.4
0.25 55.1 1.5 0.9 2.6 1.5 1.0 1.9 0.9 0.8
CW DF LRA PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l2
1 92.6 93.8 92.6 93.0 93.0 93.0 92.6 92.6 92.6
1.5 84.8 87.2 83.4 83.8 83.4 83.4 83.8 83.6 83.6
2 70.6 79.0 68.0 68.8 68.0 67.6 69.8 69.0 67.8
2.5 46.4 67.4 41.6 45.6 40.4 37.6 45.6 41.8 39.2
3 17.2 54.2 11.2 17.4 12.4 10.2 18.6 13.4 11.0
SparseFool EAD PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l1
5 94.9 89.8 90.3 90.2 90.2 90.5 90.2 90.0
8.75 89.1 71.2 75.5 74.0 72.7 75.3 73.7 72.2
12.5 81.0 45.9 61.1 57.5 54.9 55.6 49.2 45.7
16.25 72.8 20.6 49.2 42.3 38.4 32.2 24.1 20.8
20 60.8 8.3 41.4 29.6 23.2 15.2 9.4 7.7
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Table 10. Comparison of l∞-, l2- and l1-attacks on a naturally trained model on CIFAR-10. We report the accuracy in percentage of the
classifier on the test set if the attack is allowed to perturb the test points of  in lp-distance. The statistics are computed on the first 1000
points on the test set for l∞ and l1, on 500 points for l2.
Robust accuracy of CIFAR-10 plain model
metric  DF DAA-
1
DAA-
50
PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l∞
1/255 62.6 65.7 64.1 56.1 55.8 55.6 56.5 55.9 55.7
1.5/255 49.3 63.2 60.8 38.9 37.9 37.4 38.5 37.7 37.4
2/255 37.3 62.4 58.5 24.3 23.3 22.9 23.4 21.9 21.2
2.5/255 26.4 61.2 56.3 16.2 14.8 14.0 13.2 12.0 11.8
3/255 19.0 60.2 54.4 10.7 9.2 8.6 7.4 5.8 5.4
CW DF LRA PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l2
0.1 69.4 72.2 69.0 68.4 67.6 67.6 68.4 68.4 68.4
0.15 55.4 62.6 55.0 54.6 53.8 53.8 54.6 54.0 53.8
0.2 43.4 51.2 43.4 43.8 42.8 42.0 42.4 42.0 41.8
0.3 21.6 33.8 22.0 24.8 24.2 23.6 21.6 20.8 20.6
0.4 9.4 20.8 9.8 18.2 16.2 15.4 9.6 8.2 8.0
SparseFool EAD PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l1
2 72.1 54.7 54.9 54.4 53.9 55.5 52.2 50.8
4 58.6 24.1 30.0 29.1 28.9 30.7 25.1 22.4
6 45.6 8.9 18.8 18.6 18.4 17.0 10.5 8.1
8 34.3 3.0 14.2 14.1 14.0 7.8 3.8 2.5
10 27.2 0.7 12.9 12.5 12.3 4.7 1.5 1.0
Table 11. Comparison of l∞-, l2- and l1-attacks on an l∞-robust model on CIFAR-10. We report the accuracy in percentage of the
classifier on the test set if the attack is allowed to perturb the test points of  in lp-distance. The statistics are computed on the first 1000
points on the test set for l∞ and l1, on 500 points for l2.
Robust accuracy of CIFAR-10 l∞-robust model
metric  DF DAA-
1
DAA-
50
PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l∞
2/255 66.8 66.9 66.3 65.5 65.5 65.5 65.8 65.8 65.7
4/255 53.2 63.8 61.4 49.8 49.3 49.0 49.2 49.1 48.9
6/255 42.9 63.1 58.4 38.0 36.9 36.6 35.4 34.7 34.6
8/255 32.9 61.2 56.3 30.5 30.0 29.6 23.8 23.5 23.3
10/255 24.5 59.8 54.1 25.8 23.7 22.4 15.4 14.7 14.4
CW DF LRA PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l2
0.25 64.6 67.0 64.4 64.4 64.4 64.4 64.8 64.6 64.4
0.5 48.4 53.0 48.8 49.0 48.4 48.0 48.4 48.4 48.2
0.75 33.4 41.4 33.4 39.0 38.2 37.4 33.6 33.2 33.0
1 22.8 32.6 22.8 35.0 34.4 33.8 22.2 21.6 21.4
1.25 12.0 24.2 13.0 34.6 34.2 33.2 12.2 11.2 11.2
SparseFool EAD PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l1
5 57.8 36.8 47.3 46.6 46.2 43.1 39.9 37.9
8.75 44.7 19.2 37.4 37.0 36.8 25.7 22.5 20.2
12.5 34.9 7.1 34.0 33.9 33.9 13.7 10.9 8.7
16.25 27.6 3.0 33.3 33.2 33.1 7.1 4.3 3.5
20 20.2 0.9 32.9 32.8 32.8 3.8 1.7 1.3
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Table 12. Comparison of l∞-, l2- and l1-attacks on an l2-robust model on CIFAR-10. We report the accuracy in percentage of the classifier
on the test set if the attack is allowed to perturb the test points of  in lp-distance. The statistics are computed on the first 1000 points on
the test set for l∞ and l1, on 500 points for l2.
Robust accuracy of CIFAR-10 l2-robust model
metric  DF DAA-
1
DAA-
50
PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l∞
2/255 64.1 67.2 66.3 62.6 62.5 62.4 62.7 62.6 62.6
4/255 49.0 65.0 62.8 45.3 45.0 44.9 44.4 44.2 44.2
6/255 36.9 64.2 60.8 32.9 31.6 31.1 27.2 26.8 26.7
8/255 25.8 62.3 58.0 25.7 24.9 23.9 14.8 14.1 13.8
10/255 17.6 61.9 54.8 21.9 19.8 18.6 8.6 8.0 7.9
CW DF LRA PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l2
0.25 66.0 67.0 65.6 65.8 65.6 65.6 65.6 65.6 65.6
0.5 48.2 53.8 47.8 49.6 48.8 48.8 48.4 48.2 48.0
0.75 32.6 42.2 32.4 38.4 37.2 36.4 32.8 32.4 32.2
1 21.6 30.0 21.6 35.4 33.6 33.0 21.8 21.4 21.0
1.25 11.4 22.4 12.4 34.2 31.6 31.2 12.2 12.2 11.4
SparseFool EAD PGD-
1
PGD-
10
PGD-
100
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
FAB-
100
l1
3 69.5 62.2 64.5 64.4 64.4 63.4 63.2 63.0
6 61.6 45.5 51.9 51.9 51.8 48.6 47.2 45.6
9 53.1 27.7 42.8 42.5 42.5 33.9 30.6 28.8
12 44.4 17.9 38.5 38.3 38.0 23.8 19.8 17.3
15 37.0 10.4 35.8 35.8 35.4 16.0 12.4 11.2
Table 13. Comparison of l∞-, l2- and l1-attacks on a naturally trained model on Restricted ImageNet. We report the accuracy in percentage
of the classifier on the test set if the attack is allowed to perturb the test points of  in lp-distance. The statistics are computed on the first
500 points of the test set.
Robust accuracy of Restricted ImageNet plain model
metric  DF DAA-
1
DAA-
10
PGD-
1
PGD-
10
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
l∞
0.25/255 76.6 74.8 74.8 74.8 74.6 75.2 75.2
0.5/255 52.0 51.8 48.2 38.2 37.8 39.6 39.6
0.75/255 26.8 46.0 41.0 12.2 12.2 14.2 14.2
1/255 11.2 43.2 39.4 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.6
1.25/255 5.0 41.2 38.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0
DF PGD-
1
PGD-
10
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
l2
0.2 80.2 76.0 76.0 77.0 76.8
0.4 58.4 40.8 40.6 43.0 42.2
0.6 33.8 15.4 14.8 19.0 18.2
0.8 18.8 4.0 4.0 4.6 4.4
1 8.6 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.0
SparseFool PGD-
1
PGD-
5
FAB-
1
FAB-
5
l1
5 88.6 81.8 81.8 79.6 78.0
16 80.0 45.2 45.2 46.8 40.0
27 70.6 17.8 17.4 25.6 19.8
38 65.0 6.2 6.0 13.6 7.0
49 55.4 2.2 2.2 6.8 3.8
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Table 14. Comparison of l∞-, l2- and l1-attacks on an l∞-robust model on Restricted ImageNet. We report the accuracy in percentage of
the classifier on the test set if the attack is allowed to perturb the test points of  in lp-distance. The statistics are computed on the first 500
points of the test set.
Robust accuracy of Restricted ImageNet l∞-robust model
metric  DF DAA-
1
DAA-
10
PGD-
1
PGD-
10
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
l∞
2/255 75.8 75.0 75.0 74.6 74.6 75.2 75.2
4/255 53.0 46.2 46.2 45.4 45.4 47.4 47.4
6/255 32.4 24.6 23.8 19.4 19.4 21.2 21.0
8/255 19.4 17.0 14.6 6.2 6.2 6.8 6.8
10/255 10.8 12.8 11.6 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.2
DF PGD-
1
PGD-
10
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
l2
1 79.4 76.6 76.6 77.0 76.8
2 65.0 46.8 46.2 49.8 49.2
3 46.8 22.4 21.4 24.4 23.8
4 32.8 9.0 8.6 10.8 10.6
5 20.4 3.0 2.8 3.2 3.2
SparseFool PGD-
1
PGD-
5
FAB-
1
FAB-
5
l1
15 81.8 69.8 69.8 69.6 68.2
25 76.4 58.6 58.2 56.2 53.6
40 71.4 41.0 41.0 41.2 37.6
60 63.2 28.8 28.8 28.2 23.8
100 49.2 12.0 11.6 14.6 11.2
Table 15. Comparison of l∞-, l2- and l1-attacks on an l2-robust model on Restricted ImageNet. We report the accuracy in percentage of
the classifier on the test set if the attack is allowed to perturb the test points of  in lp-distance. The statistics are computed on the first 500
points of the test set.
Robust accuracy of Restricted ImageNet l2-robust model
metric  DF DAA-
1
DAA-
10
PGD-
1
PGD-
10
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
l∞
2/255 74.4 73.0 73.0 73.0 73.0 73.8 73.8
4/255 49.0 39.6 39.2 37.6 37.6 39.6 39.4
6/255 27.4 22.6 21.0 13.2 13.2 15.0 15.0
8/255 13.8 18.6 16.8 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.2
10/255 6.6 15.6 13.8 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8
DF PGD-
1
PGD-
50
FAB-
1
FAB-
10
l2
2 74.2 71.8 71.8 72.8 72.8
3 61.6 51.4 51.0 52.4 52.4
4 45.6 31.0 30.8 34.4 33.8
5 34.6 20.4 20.4 22.6 21.8
6 25.2 9.6 9.6 11.8 11.6
SparseFool PGD-
1
PGD-
5
FAB-
1
FAB-
5
l1
50 85.4 81.0 81.0 78.6 78.4
100 79.6 63.8 63.6 60.8 59.0
150 74.4 48.4 48.4 45.2 42.2
200 68.6 32.2 32.2 31.0 29.0
250 60.0 23.0 22.4 22.8 20.2
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C. Analysis of the attacks
C.1. Choice of the step size of PGD
We here show the performance of PGD wrt l1, l2, l∞ on
MNIST (top row of Figure 5) and CIFAR-10 (bottom row of
Figure 5) for different choices of the step size. In particular
we focus on large . We report the robust accuracy as a func-
tion of iterations (in total 150 iterations). We test step sizes
/t for t ∈ {1, 2, 4, 10, 25, 75}. For each step size we show
the best run out of 10, with random initialization, which
achieve the lowest robust accuracy after 150 iterations.
• l2: In Figure 5 we show, for each dataset, the results
for the three models used in Section 3, with decreasing
step size corresponding to darker shades of blue, while
our chosen step size for l2, that is /4, is highlighted in
red. We see that it achieves in all the models best or
close to best robust accuracy.
• l∞: We show in Figure 4 the same plots as for l2 but
instead for l∞, the chosen stepsize /10 for l∞-attacks
is highlighted in red. Again, we see that it is on average
performing best.
• l1: We show in Figure 6 the same plots as for l2 but
instead for l1, the chosen stepsize /2 for l1-attacks is
highlighted in red. Again, we see that it is on average
performing best.
C.2. Evolution across iteration
We compare the evolution of the robust accuracy across
the iterations of PGD-1 (random starting point) and FAB-
1 (starting at the target point xorig). for the models and
datasets from 7 to 15. Since PGD performs 1 forward and 1
backward pass for each iteration and FAB 2 forward passes
and 1 backward pass, we rescale the robust accuracy so to
compare the two methods when they have used exactly the
same number of passes of the network. Then 300 passes
correspond to 150 iterations of PGD and to 100 of FAB. In
Figures 7, 8 and 9 we show the evolution of robust accuracy
for the different datasets, models and threat models (l∞, l2
and l1), computed at two thresholds  among the five used
in Tables 7 to 15. One can see how FAB achieves in most
of the cases good results within a few iterations, often faster
than PGD.
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MNIST - l∞-attack
CIFAR-10 - l∞-attack
Figure 4. Evolution of robust accuracy as a function of the iterations for different step sizes for PGD wrt l∞. In red the step size we used
in the experiments of Section 3. The models used are those trained on MNIST (top row) and CIFAR-10 (bottom row).
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MNIST - l2-attack
CIFAR-10 - l2-attack
Figure 5. Evolution of robust accuracy as a function of the iterations for different step sizes for PGD wrt l2. In red the step size we used in
the experiments of Section 3. The models used are those trained on MNIST (top row) and CIFAR-10 (bottom row).
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MNIST - l1-attack
CIFAR-10 - l1-attack
Figure 6. Evolution of robust accuracy as a function of the iterations for different step sizes for PGD wrt l1. In red the step size we used in
the experiments of Section 3. The models used are those trained on MNIST (top row) and CIFAR-10 (bottom row).
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MNIST, l∞
MNIST, l2
MNIST, l1
Figure 7. Evolution of robust accuracy as a function of the employed forward/backward passes on MNIST to ensure a fair comparison of
PGD and FAB. We compare PGD-1 (magenta) and FAB-1 (black). Models: plain in the first column, l∞-at in the second and l2-at in the
third. Threat models: l∞ in the first row, l2 in the second and l1 in the third. The thresholds  used can be read above the plots.
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CIFAR-10, l∞
CIFAR-10, l2
CIFAR-10, l1
Figure 8. Evolution of robust accuracy as a function of the employed forward/backward passes on CIFAR-10 to ensure a fair comparison
of PGD and FAB. We compare PGD-1 (magenta) and FAB-1 (black). Models: plain in the first column, l∞-at in the second and l2-at in
the third. Threat models: l∞ in the first row, l2 in the second and l1 in the third. The thresholds  used can be read above the plots.
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Restricted ImageNet, l∞
Restricted ImageNet, l2
Restricted ImageNet, l1
Figure 9. Evolution of robust accuracy as a function of the employed forward/backward passes on Restricted ImageNet to ensure a fair
comparison of PGD and FAB. We compare PGD-1 (magenta) and FAB-1 (black). Models: plain in the first column, l∞-at in the second
and l2-at in the third. Threat models: l∞ in the first row, l2 in the second and l1 in the third. The thresholds  used can be read above the
plots.
